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Abstract 
 
There are well-understood psychological limits on our capacity to process information. As 
information proliferation—the consumption and sharing of information—increases through 
social media and other communications technology, these limits create an attentional bottleneck, 
favoring information that is more likely to be searched for, attended to, comprehended, encoded, 
and later reproduced. In information-rich environments, this bottleneck influences the evolution 
of information via four forces of cognitive selection, selecting for information that is belief-
consistent, negative, social, and predictive. Selection for belief-consistent information leads 
balanced information to support increasingly polarized views. Selection for negative information 
amplifies information about downside risks and crowds out potential benefits. Selection for 
social information drives herding, impairs objective assessments, and reduces exploration for 
solutions to hard problems. Selection for predictive patterns drives overfitting, the replication 
crisis, and risk seeking. This article summarizes the negative implications of these forces of 
cognitive selection and presents eight warnings, which represent severe pitfalls for the naive 
informavore, accelerating extremism, hysteria, herding, and the proliferation of misinformation.  
 
 
Keywords: misinformation, evolution, social risk amplification, social proof, attention 
economics 
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Introduction 
Anti-expert speech, fake news as a political weapon, the replication crisis, relentless health 
warnings associating cancer with everything we eat, and the richly documented pathologies of 
online inattention are all symptoms of a rising awareness that information is not benign (Bawden 
& Robinson, 2009; Carr, 2011; Eppler, 2015; Jacoby, Speller, & Cohn, 1974; Schoenfeld & 
Ioannidis, 2012; Schwartz, 2004). A common contributor to each of these problems and the 
focus of this article is information proliferation—the capacity to access and contribute to a 
growing quantity of information. According to the International Telecommunications Union 
(2017), more than 4 billion people are now mobile-broadband users, granting each near 
instantaneous power to access, create, and share information. This represents a five-fold increase 
since 2010. Over the same period of time the number of webpages available has risen into the 
billions (Van den Bosch & De Kunder, 2016).1 The result of this proliferation is that information 
is placed increasingly under the influence of an attention economy (e.g., Lanham, 2006) in which 
a growing number of people influence the evolution of information by what they choose to pay 
attention to (e.g., Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2010).   
Herbert Simon captured the central constraint on this attention economy when he noted 
that “information…consumes the attention of its recipients” (p. 40, Simon, 1971). We are limited 
in how much information we can attend to from outside sources (sometimes called the cocktail 
party problem, e.g., Conway & Cowan, 2001) and how much information we can process (e.g., 
in working memory, Miller, 1956). Thus, too much information threatens us with information 
overload and other pathologies of attention that have been well-documented elsewhere (Bawden 
& Robinson, 2009; Carr, 2011). This articles focuses on a less well-documented but perhaps 
more pernicious problem: how information rich environments place information under the forces 
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of cognitive selection, driving information evolution much like other forms of selection drive 
biological evolution.  
The evolution of the information ecosystem  
The cognitive life-cycle of information (see Figure 1) provides a framework for 
understanding how cognitive selection shapes information’s evolution as it progresses from one 
mind to the next.  In this life-cycle, cognitive selection favors information that is more likely to 
be searched for, attended to, comprehended, encoded, and reproduced (e.g., Hills & Adelman, 
2015; Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 2008; Blackmore, 2000).  
Information proliferation influences information evolution in two ways, by increasing 
competition and by reducing information’s generation time. Increasing competition for attention 
means that more signals compete for receivers, enhancing the role of cognitive selection.  More 
competition is also functionally equivalent to greater amounts of background noise. 
Communication signals adapt to increasing noise in ways consistent with information’s life-
cycle, by becoming easier for receivers to detect, recall, and reproduce (e.g., Arak & Enquist, 
1995; Hills, Adelman, & Noguchi, 2017; Luther et al., 2009). This favors some kinds of 
information over others.  For example, misinformation has an advantage in competitive 
environments because it is freed from the constraints of being truthful, allowing it to adapt to 
cognition’s biases for more distinctive and emotionally appealing information (Schomaker & 
Meeter, 2015; Hamman, 2001). These are both factors associated with the empirical finding that 
lies proliferate faster than the truth (Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018).  
Information proliferation also reduces information’s generation time—the time it takes for 
information to move from one mind to another. This is analogous to biological evolution’s 
generation time. A general rule of evolution is that faster generation times accelerate adaptation 
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(e.g., Thomas, Welch, Lanfear, & Bromham, 2010). The more rapidly people can access, select, 
and reproduce preferred information, the more readily will that information reflect the cognitive 
biases of its users. 
Though cognitive selection can produce beneficial outcomes by selecting for valuable 
information, the focus here is on selective forces that drive unwanted outcomes of information 
proliferation, such as extremism, hysteria, herding, and misinformation. In the remainder of this 
article we will look at biases that when combined with information proliferation produce each of 
these outcomes.  In particular, we will focus on cognition selection for information that is 1) 
belief-consistent, 2) negative, 3) social, and 4) predictive.  
 
Figure 1: Information proliferation enhances the influence of cognitive selection. A) Information 
undergoes cognitive selection at each stage in its life-cycle, as it passes from receiver to memory 
to producer and on to the next receiver. B) Information proliferation (denoted by ‘a’) increases 
the amount of information available to receivers and competing for attention and future 
production. Cognitive selection implies that information loss (denotes by ‘x’s) is not random, but 
is instead driven by cognition’s biases for belief-consistent, negative, social, and predictive 
information, which influences the evolution of information in a feedforward process. 
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Selection for Belief-Consistent Information 
Belief-consistent selection encompasses a range of psychological phenomena associated 
with tendencies to seek out, encode in memory, and reproduce information consistent with prior 
beliefs. The processes underlying belief-consistent selection are often difficult to distinguish in 
practice, but roughly correspond to confirmation bias, biased assimilation, and motivated 
reasoning, respectively. A paradigmatic example is that giving people balanced information on 
ideological issues frequently leaves them more polarized on such wide-ranging topics as capital 
punishment, legal cases, vaccines, climate change, the effects of video games, and politics 
(Corner, Whitmarsh, & Xenias, 2012; Greitemeyer, 2014; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Munro & 
Ditto, 1997; Munro et al., 2002; Nan & Daily, 2015; Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & 
Hamann, 2006).  
Though Asch (1955) is often considered a standard example of selection for social 
information, what this research also showed is that when an individual held an unpopular belief, 
the presence of one other individual who shared that belief was sufficient to reinforce public 
commitment to this minority opinion nearly to its levels in the absence of any opposition. 
Similarly, when like-minded people share views—even when they all have the same 
information—these views tend to be held with more confidence (Schkade, Sunstein, & Hastie, 
2010; Sunstein, 2002). This happens even when performance is unchanged (Tsai, Klayman, & 
Hastie, 2008).  
Information proliferation effectively adds fuel to this fire. Belief-consistent selection 
becomes more prevalent as information increases (Fischer, Schulz-Hardt, & Frey, 2008; Kardes, 
Cronley, Kellaris, & Posavac, 2004). Information proliferation therefore leads people to 
personalize information and avoid belief-inconsistent information. Algorithms do this for us in 
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the form of recommender systems and search engines guided by browser history. On social 
media, tendencies for ingroup selection lead to filter bubbles and echo chambers, which further 
reduce individual exposure to information diversity even as they increase diversity across social 
media as a whole (Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015; Nikolov, Oliveira, 
Flammini, & Menczer, 2015).  
The tendency to select like-minded individuals in decision making is often associated with 
groupthink, with groups defensively insulating themselves from external views.  Groupthink has 
been blamed for numerous political and economic fiascos (Bénabou, 2012). Information 
proliferation now extends the capacity for groupthink globally, organizing and polarizing groups 
from political ideologues to international terrorists (Aly, 2016). 
Why does belief-consistent selection exist? There are a number of likely contributors: 
Selecting belief consistent information provides a rewarding feeling of sense-making while 
reducing identity-threatening information (Chater & Loewenstein, 2016; Festinger, 1962); An 
unwavering argument—that sweeps inconsistencies under the rug—better influences others 
(Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Trivers, 2011); and people view information and the attitudes 
associated with them as cultural codes, which allow communities of like-minded individuals to 
identify their ingroup and cooperate on that basis (e.g., Marshall, 2015). These are all further 
reinforced by people’s tendency to understand and recall information in relation to narrative 
structures for causality that they already understand (e.g., Bartlett, 1932), which represents a 
cognitive blind spot for information inconsistent with prior beliefs.  
Selection for Negative Information 
Heightened sensitivity to negative information is part of our evolutionary heritage. This 
sensitivity leads us to weight disadvantages over advantages in information seeking and decision 
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making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991) and drives the well-known news trope: “if it bleeds, it 
leads.” When applied to information proliferation, a negativity bias induces us to identify and 
recommunicate information about risk at the expense of more balanced information.  
The preferential sharing of risk information leads to social risk amplification (Kasperson et 
al., 1988). In a study by Moussaïd, Brighton, and Gaissmaier (2015), information was 
communicated through a chain of individuals, similar to the children’s game ‘telephone.’ The 
first individual in the chain was introduced to the information through a set of balanced articles 
discussing triclosan, an antibacterial agent. As this information was proliferated from one 
individual to the next, it rapidly lost key facts about triclosan’s usefulness while preserving and 
adding additional but unsupported information about downside risks related to health 
consequences and prevalence. As a real world example, when the first Ebola case was diagnosed 
in the United States this led Twitter posts mentioning Ebola to jump from 100 posts per minute 
to 6000 per minute and rapidly produced inaccurate claims that Ebola could be transmitted 
through food, water, and air (Luckerson, 2014). 
The Ebola example reflects another potential bias in risk communication: social risk 
amplification is especially prominent for dread risks—unpredictable, catastrophic, and 
indiscriminant risks to life and limb such as plane crashes, nuclear disasters, epidemics, and 
terrorism (Slovic, 1987). Jagiello & Hills (2018) found that social risk amplification was 
substantially larger for dread risk (nuclear power) than for non-dread risk (food additives). 
Moreover, Jagiello & Hills (2018) also found that socially amplified risk was resilient to the re-
introduction of the initial balanced information. This supports one of the central threats of 
information proliferation: information proliferated through individuals selects for information 
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that is better adapted to cognition than information designed to provide a more balanced 
perspective (see also Ng, Yang, & Viswanath, 2017). 
Social risk amplification helps explain the recent rise in what Kahneman (2011) calls the 
precationary principle, a propensity to base decisions about new technology on their potential 
downside risks without consideration for their potential benefits. Information proliferation 
rapidly makes risk the reason for taking one action over another. In the extremes, this incites 
hysteria and motivates Ulrich Beck’s (1992) claim that we are currently living in a risk society.  
Selection for Social Information 
People’s appetite for social information has led some to suggest that smartphones induce 
hypernatural social monitoring (Veissière & Stendel, 2018) and others to observe that 
information on social media crowds out other kinds of information in memory (Mickes et al., 
2013). Where people do not have strong ideological convictions otherwise, social information 
can lead to herding and undermine collective wisdom (Asch, 1955; Raafat, Chater, & Frith, 
2009; Lorenz, Rauhut, Schweitzer, & Helbing, 2011). 
Salganik, Dodds, & Watts (2006) studied people’s music choices by allowing people to 
listen to fragments of songs and then download a song of their choice. Some participants could 
also see what other people had chosen. Groups of independent decision makers were more like 
other independent groups, sharing their diversity of views, than where groups exposed to social 
influence, which rapidly diverged from one another. There was also more inequality among 
winning songs when individuals had social information than when individuals chose in isolation. 
In other words, social information both added noise and amplified it. The same socially-fueled 
‘preferential attachment’ is blamed on long-tailed distributions of citation counts among 
scientific papers (Clauset, Larremore, & Sinatra, 2017) and observed in online auctions, where 
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bidders follow bidders instead of other quality indicators (Huang & Chen, 2006; Simonsohn & 
Ariely, 2008). 
When problems are easy, social information can be good: social connectivity increases the 
rate at which groups converge on optimal solutions. But for hard problems, high levels of social 
connectivity prevent groups from finding optimal solutions because they lead groups to exploit 
suboptimal solutions too quickly (Barkoczi & Galesic, 2016; Fang, Lee, & Schilling, 2010; 
Mason, Jones, & Goldstone, 2008, Lazer & Friedman, 2007).  
Imitating others provides humans with what Bandura (1965) called no-trial learning.  Such 
no-trial-learning is especially effective in uncertain environments, where the informational 
contingencies are complex, mistakes are costly, other people have good information, and 
individuals need to coordinate to produce effective outcomes (Kameda & Nakanishi, 2003; 
Goldstone & Gureckis, 2009). But when an individual can use information from another 
individual to make a decision, neuroimaging evidence indicates that this turns off the executive 
processing associated with a more critical evaluation of the choice (Engelmann, Capra, Noussair, 
& Berns, 2009). The proliferation of social information therefore threatens our better judgment. 
Selection for Predictive Information 
A bias for pattern identification can be completely devoid of other biases and still run 
aground in a sea of data. The problem arises because information proliferation promotes spurious 
correlations. Consider that the probability of a false positive (type I error) approaches 1.0 as the 
number of comparisons increases.2 When a single researcher performs multiple tests, they can 
correct for this by lowering 𝛼 values (Bonferonni corrections). When multiple researchers 
perform multiple tests this problem can be alleviated by publishing negative results, avoiding the 
file drawer problem. But when multiple researchers test multiple hypotheses, there is presently 
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no cure: even if all hypotheses were pre-registered and every individual researcher reported all 
tests, the absolute number of type I errors would grow with the number of researchers (Ioannidis, 
2005).  
If positive findings enjoy a selection bias for publication, then the proportion of false 
positives in print will increase with the number of unique hypotheses tested. Moreover, more 
information (i.e., covariates) combined with a bias for positive results invites researchers down a 
“garden of forking paths” during analysis, where a plethora of alternative analyses make positive 
findings easy to generate and deceptively intuitive given post-hoc theorizing (Munafò et al., 
2017; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011).  
Similar biases play out in economic decision making. People who experience monetary 
payoffs from a set of alternatives will tend to choose riskier alternatives (seeking rare but illusory 
gains) as the set size of possible alternatives increases (Ert & Erev, 2007; Noguchi & Hills, 
2016). This happens because high-variance alternatives are more likely to produce extreme 
outcomes. The probability that one of them will do so increases with the absolute number of 
high-variance alternatives considered (Figure 2). As a consequence, the likelihood of spurious 
‘super’ performers (as well as super failures) grows with the number of contenders purely as a 
function of statistical noise (see Denrell, 2005; Denrell & Liu, 2012; Shermer, 2014).  
Data-driven machine learning is not a solution. Without input from theory, ‘blind’ machine 
learning can do far worse as a result of the curse of dimensionality—too many predictors and not 
enough data to tease them apart (Huys, Maia, & Frank, 2016). A recent article in The Economist 
(2013) quotes MIT’s Sandy Pentland as reporting that three-quarters of machine learning results 
are nonsensical due to “overfitting.” The iconic overfitting example is Google Flu Trends which 
rapidly went from online oracle to victim of big data hubris when it began over-predicting 
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influenza-like illness by a factor of two relative to the Center for Disease Control (Lazer, 
Kennedy, King, & Vespignani, 2014). Similar cases have been made against data-driven 
approaches to election prediction (Gayo-Avello, 2012) and criminology (Chan & Bennett Moses, 
2016). Given the nested black-box nature of many proprietary machine learning algorithms, 
overfitting is often extremely difficult to detect in real-world settings, which also happen to be 
the places where they can do the most harm (e.g., O’Neil, 2017). 
 
Figure 2: The probability of choosing a risky alternative as a function of the number of 
alternatives considered. A decision maker chooses between m alternatives, half of which are safe 
and pay off S with probability 1.0 and the other half are risky, paying off R (>S) with probability 
p and otherwise 0. As the number of alternatives to choose from increases, a decision maker who 
chooses the outcome with the highest sample payoff after 1 sample from each alternative will be 
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increasingly likely to choose a risky option. This follows 1-(1-p)m/2 and a similar logic to type I 
errors. 
 
Conclusions 
The problems described above are not easily remedied. They are in part the negative 
outcomes of cognitive heuristics that have paid for themselves in our evolutionary past. The 
adaptive value of these heuristics represents the light side of information, including features such 
as ingroup identification and risk avoidance (see Table 1). The dark side is that cognitive 
selection’s reliance on these heuristics in an information rich environment distorts what 
information is available and reduces our capacity to use that information objectively.  
These problems can be summarized in a list of 8 warnings for contemporary information 
environments:  
1) Information becomes more appealing to humans as it moves through human minds.  
2) Balanced information about ideological issues reinforces divergent beliefs.  
3) When people share similar divergent beliefs with one another, they often become more 
confident in their beliefs, even when they learn nothing more than that other people know what 
they do.  
4) Information about costs proliferates more readily than information about benefits; this 
can prevent cost-benefit analysis and reduce decision making to risk avoidance.  
5) Social information crowds out individual quality indicators and impairs objective 
assessments.  
6) Social information reduces exploration for hard problems.  
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7) More information can lead to overfitting and the detection of spurious correlations 
driven by rare events. 
8) As we become aware of more alternatives, the most appealing alternatives become 
increasingly risky. 
These warnings reflect advantages for misinformation in information rich environments. 
Like science, information is to some degree self-correcting. In a just attention economy, 
maladaptive information should eventually lead to costs borne by those who use it. But the rate 
of correction necessary to resolve misinformation increases with the rate of its proliferation. 
Developing methods to keep up with this tide of misinformation is a growing interdisciplinary 
concern, cutting across science and politics alike (e.g., Lazer et al., 2018; Lewandowsky, Ecker, 
& Cook, 2017; see also Simon, 1976). Understanding how cognitive selection interacts with 
information proliferation is a key step in this process. 
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Table I: The effect of cognitive selection on information proliferation 
Properties of 
Information 
Adapted to 
Cognitive 
Selection 
Adaptive Value Negative Consequences 
when combined with 
information 
proliferation 
Characteristic 
References 
Belief-
consistent  
Identifying the 
ingroup, 
commitment, 
reduction of 
cognitive 
dissonance, sense-
making 
Polarization 
 
 
Overconfidence  
Munro & Ditto, 1997; 
Sunstein, 2002 
 
Schkade et al., 2010; 
Tsai et al., 2008 
Social  No-trial learning, 
ingroup identity 
formation   
Reduced exploration  
 
 
 
Long-tailed preference 
distributions  
Mason et al., 2008; 
Barkoczi & Galesic, 
2016 
 
Salganik et al., 2006; 
Huang & Chen, 2006 
Negative  Risk identification 
and avoidance 
Loss of positive 
information  
 
Truth distortion 
amplifying apparent 
risks  
Kasperson et al., 1988; 
Jagiello & Hills, 2018 
 
Moussaïd et al., 2015 
Predictive  Learning, 
identifying 
contingencies 
associated with 
opportunities and 
threats  
Replication crisis  
 
Risk-seeking  
 
Super-
successes/failures 
driven by noise  
 
Overfitting  
Ioannidis, 2005 
 
Ert & Erev, 2007 
 
Denrell & Liu, 2012 
 
 
Lazer et al., 2014; Gayo-
Avello, 2012 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 According to an international team of researchers providing real-time statistics on the internet, 
so far today (13:43 GMT, 16th of May, 2018) 3.1 million blog posts have been posted, 41.8 
million photos have been uploaded to Instagram, 398.1 million tweets have been sent via 
Twitter, 3.3 billion google searches have been made, and 138.4 billion emails have been sent 
(Internet Live Stats, 2018). 
2 If tests are independent and each have a probability of success 𝑝 (i.e., rejection of the null), then 
in 𝑛 tests the probability of seeing no successes is (1 − 𝑝)𝑛. The probability of seeing at least 
one success is therefore 1 − (1 − 𝑝)𝑛, which approaches 1 as 𝑛 increases for all values of 𝑝. 
